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ABSTRACT
Early Warning System (EWS) is a system that tries to predict the probability of crises using environmental factors. 
This study seeks to develop an EWS for the probability of systemic banking crises in East Asian countries by using a 
logit model taking into account a wide range of political and economic factors. Results reveal that short-term debt 
and exchange rate depreciation may trigger speculative attacks during political instability, economic slowdown, and 
inefficient regulatory environments. Policymakers and regulators may be able to prevent crises by stabilizing political 
and economic conditions. Furthermore, results indicate that government instability, corruption, high short-term debt, 
unstable monetary and fiscal policies do not only reduce investors’ confidence but also prevent effective crisis prevention 
strategies. Therefore, by adopting the EWS the government would be able to monitor environmental changes causing crises.
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ABSTRAK
Sistem Amaran Awal (EWS) adalah sistem untuk meramalkan kebarangkalian berlakunya krisis ekonomi dengan 
mengambil kira perubahan faktor persekitaran. Kajian ini bertujuan membangunkan EWS dalam meramal kebarangkalian 
berlakunya krisis perbankan sistemik di negara-negara Asia Timur melalui model logit dengan mengambilkira 
pelbagai faktor politik dan ekonomi. Keputusan kajian menunjukkan bahawa hutang jangka pendek dan susut nilai 
kadar pertukaran boleh mencetuskan serangan spekulasi dalam keadaan ketidakstabilan politik, kelembapan ekonomi, 
dan persekitaran kawal selia yang tidak cekap. Penggubal dasar dan pembuat undang-undang mungkin dapat 
mencegah krisis dengan menstabilkan keadaan politik dan ekonomi. Tambahan pula, keputusan menunjukkan bahawa 
ketidakstabilan kerajaan, amalan rasuah, hutang jangka pendek yang tinggi serta dasar fiskal dan kewangan yang 
tidak stabil bukan sahaja mengurangkan keyakinan pelabur, tetapi juga menghalang pelaksanaan strategi pencegahan 
krisis yang berkesan. Oleh itu, dengan menggunapakai EWS pihak kerajaan dapat memantau perubahan persekitaran 
yang menyebabkan krisis ekonomi.
Kata kunci: Sistem Amaran Awal (EWS); kestabilan politik; krisis perbankan sistemik; Asia Timur
INTRODUCTION
Banking crises have unexpectedly influenced advanced 
and emerging countries around the world over the past 
decade. For illustration, the Asian crises of 1997-98 
were an international shock to economists and policy 
community because East Asian countries were growing 
fast (Radelet, Sachs, Cooper & Bosworth 1998). After 
a decade, the world experienced the effect of 2007 U.S. 
crisis, which later hit advanced economies. Previous 
research associated the crises with slow responses 
from policy makers, structural and financial problems, 
regulations, economic and political conditions (Kaminsky 
& Reinhart 1999; Radelet et al. 1998; Reinhart & Rogoff 
2009). Hence, these crises may be avoided if associated 
problems could be overcome.
The recurrence of crises has motivated policy 
makers and academies to study the underlying causes 
of crises. The question regarding the practical policies 
that authorities could have adopted to prevent the Asian 
and U.S. crises has drawn the attention of researchers 
to develop an Early Warning System (EWS). EWS tries 
to predict the probability of crises using environmental 
factors, such as economic conditions. Studies on EWS 
(Barrell, Davis, Karim & Liadze 2010; Demirguc-Kunt 
& Detragiache 2005; Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999) 
have associated crises with economic factors, such as 
balance of payment deficits, business cycles, short-term 
debt, interest rates, and credit growth. Although these 
factors are signal of crises, there could be other factors 
such as factors related to speculative attacks which 
can explain the recurring crises better. Hence, a deeper 
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understanding of factors explaining speculative attacks, 
such as exchange rate depreciation and short-term debt 
would help us to better understand the dynamic nature 
of the recurring crises. Unlike existing studies, the 
present study develops a EWS which takes into account 
those factors as well as political conditions besides 
economic conditions.
Speculative attacks are important factors in 
spreading a crisis, which have originated in investors’ 
fears (Krugman 1979; Radelet et al. 1998). Foreign 
reserves depletion and exchange rate depreciation in 
a pegged exchange rate can explain the relationship 
between speculative attacks and crises in which a 
substantial depletion of foreign reserves would cause 
currency depreciation and speculative attacks (Krugman 
1979).Furthermore, increasing short-term debt coupled 
with inadequate regulatory and supervisory environment 
would expose countries to rapid capital outflows and 
investors’ fears (Radelet et al. 1998). The impact of those 
factors can be exacerbated when political conditions are 
included in the analysis. When policymakers experience 
speculative attacks on their currency and capital, 
their adopted policies may be inadequate. Taking the 
example of speculative pressure on currency in a 
pegged exchange rate regime, policymakers usually try 
to defend their currency by depleting foreign reserves 
which causes even higher speculative pressures (Walter 
& Willett 2012). 
In explaining the relationship between short-term 
debt and speculative attacks, Radelet et al. (1998) 
proposed a rational panics theory in which high 
debt payments produce signals to the international 
investors to withdraw their deposits and funds from 
banks and projects which cause speculative attacks. 
Those examples show that how speculative attacks are 
associated with currency depreciation (Krugman 1979) 
and short-term debt. Furthermore, human behaviors 
such as corruption, government instability, regulatory 
environment and financial payment obligation have 
significant roles in explaining the dynamic nature of 
crises, such as during 1997-98 East Asian financial 
crises where investors and speculators reacted to short-
term debts by withdrawing credit from the East Asian 
countries. For example, Singapore which has the highest 
political stability index (23.03) compared to other East 
Asian countries as shown in Table 2 is least affected 
by the Asian financial crisis. Hence, the prediction of 
speculative attacks through EWS which can also capture 
political and economic conditions may help us to predict 
future crises better. It is crucial to consider all factors 
including the complexity of human behaviors which 
potentially trigger systemic crises. Nevertheless, it 
is impossible to employ a large number of factors in 
an empirical study. Therefore, the present study will 
adopt three indices i.e. political stability, economic 
performance and debt status considering a wide range 
of environmental factors including short-term debt, 
exchange rate depreciation, political and economic 
conditions in developing EWS for systemic banking 
crises which can further capture disparate sources of 
speculative attacks.
Given some similarities between crises (Reinhart 
& Rogoff 2009), such as the importance of investors’ 
confidence, the developed EWS using 1997-98 Asian 
crises can further predict future crises. Accordingly, the 
purpose of this study is to develop a straightforward 
and comprehensive EWS by employing three indices of 
economic performance, political stability, and debt status 
as well as exchange rate depreciation for 10 East Asian 
countries over the period of 1995-2010.
The remainder sections of this study are organized as 
follows. Section 2 devoted to the literature review related 
to the EWS and surveys the methodologies, indicators, 
and results of previous studies. Section 3 presents the 
methodology related to logit model. The discussion of 
the sample data and empirical specification of the EWS 
are expressed in Section 4.  Reports of the results and 
predictors of systemic banking crises are provided in 
Section 5. While the final remaining section presents the 
conclusions of this study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
EWS analysis consists of four steps; namely crisis 
detection, approaches, variable selection, and diagnostic 
tests. This analysis enables us to identify the potential 
predictors of banking crises and warn the probability 
of future crises. With regard to the first step of EWS, the 
previous studies indicate that the high banking sector 
nonperforming loans, emergency measures, large scale 
bailout costs, mergers, takeovers, and closures mark the 
onset of a systemic banking crisis (Barrell, Davis, Karim, 
Liadze  2010; Barrell et al. 2011; Caprio & Klingebiel 
2003; Cashin & Duttagupta 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache 1998; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache 2005; 
Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999). The detection of crises 
enables researchers to proceed to the next step of adopting 
an appropriate approach. 
There are different approaches to develop an EWS; 
namely signal approach, Binary Classification Tree 
(BCT) and logit model. The first two approaches conduct 
a non-parametric analysis on the behavior of each 
country-specific factor during tranquility and crises. 
Signal approach sets a threshold level for each predictor 
of crises and compares the value of each predictor with 
its threshold level. If the value of a predictor exceeds its 
threshold level, it signals the onset of a crisis in 12 to24 
months (Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999). Signal approach 
suffers from the problem of contradictory signals from 
different predictors. On the other hand, BCT is a decision 
tree tool, which issues various sets of rules from variables 
(Cashin & Duttagupta 2008). Although BCT has overcome 
the problem of contradictory signals by considering 
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various predictors in issuing a rule, it can hardly take 
into account the interactions among predictors (Cashin 
& Duttagupta 2008). 
In order to solve the aforementioned problems, 
parametric approach of logit model uses a set of variables 
to develop a model and estimate the probability of crises. 
Hence, it avoids the problems of possible contradictory 
signals and disregarded interactions among variables 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 1998; Eichengreen, 
Rose & Wyplosz 1996; Frankel & Rose 1996). Given 
the discussed background, the current study adopts logit 
approach to estimate the probability of banking crises, 
which can employ economic and political variables in 
predicting the probability of crises. 
In developing the EWS, researchers have encountered 
variable selection problems because there are disparate 
reasons for banking crises, such as speculative attacks, 
economic conditions, and political instabilities.  There 
is a consensus among researchers on the contribution 
of economic and political variables to EWS. However, 
the problem is the anomalous behaviors of countries, 
which make it difficult to generate a unique EWS. With 
regard to the former, an overview of empirical studies 
(Barrell et al. 2010; Caprio & Klingebiel 2003; Cashin & 
Duttagupta 2008; Davis & Karim 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt 
& Detragiache 1998; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache 
2005; Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz  1994; Eichengreen 
et al. 1996; Frankel & Rose 1996; Kaminsky & Reinhart 
1999; Männasoo & Mayes 2009)  show that they have 
used different macroeconomic variables. Indeed, the 
economic variables associate crises with the conditions 
of financial sectors, external sectors, and real sectors. 
With regard to the latter, a few studies (Biglaiser, 
Derouen & Archer 2011; Leblang & Satyanath 
2006; Leblang & Satyanath 2008;), have empirically 
investigated the predictive power of political conditions 
for crises. However, the results show little influence 
in predicting the probability of crises (Biglaiser et al. 
2011). The existing empirical studies can hardly report 
significant influence for economic instability, political 
conditions, and regulatory environments because of 
small changes in their figures. Therefore, the present 
study will improve the predictive power of EWS by 
considering disparate aspects of political instability, 
regulatory environment, economic instability, and 
short-term debt using indices which even capture small 
changes in figures. 
After developing the EWS for systemic crises, 
researchers assess the developed model using diagnostic 
tests. Taking the example of logit approach, they evaluate 
the predictive power of the estimated model by predicting 
the probability of crises in a sample of test data. They 
later compare the estimated probabilities with the actual 
crisis to validate whether predictions match the reality. 
Following this discussion, this study employs three 
indices for political, economic, and debt conditions 
as well as a variable for exchange rate depreciation to 
consider different underlying causes of banking crises 
in developing EWS. 
In summary, this study contributes to the field 
of EWS by using an array of political and economic 
variables as well as debt status. The variables improve 
the existing EWS by considering political and economic 
instabilities. Regulatory environment, financial 
payments, government stability and turnover, corruption 
perception, and capital policies are some political issues 
which can be the harbinger of an unstable country. In 
order to examine the impact of those factors on banking 
crises, the current study uses an index of political 
stability. In addition, the current study improves the 
existing methodology by using the indices of economic 
performance and debt status which take account of 
the vulnerability of financial sectors to shocks. The 
following section focuses on the methodology to 
develop the EWS in predicting systemic banking crises 
using East Asian data. 
METHODOLOGY
The present study adopts a logit model to estimate the 
probability of systemic banking crises and to employ 
different economic and political variables in developing 
an EWS. Logit model is a parametric approach and 
demonstrate the contribution of each factor to crises. It 
adopts a logistic Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) 
to associate a dependent variable with a set of explanatory 
variables as in Equation 1 (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 
1998; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache 2005; Kaminsky 
& Reinhart 1999; Laeven & Valencia 2010). 
PCrisis = Prob(Y = 1|x) = 
ex’β
–––––
1+ex’β
 = Λ(x’β) (1)
Λ(.) represents a logistic CDF, which offers a nonlinear 
function for Y as the dependent dummy variable with 
Y = 1 (crisis period if at least three out the following six 
criteria are fulfilled) (Laeven and Valencia, 2010; 2013). 
The six conditions are large scale nationalization, public 
bailout of more than 3 per cent of GDP, large scale asset 
purchases by central banks of more than 5 per cent of 
GDP, liquidity funding from central banks more than 5 
per cent of total banking liabilities, deposit freezes, and 
large scale guarantees on bank liabilities.1 While Y only 
takes 0 for a non-crisis period and 1 for a crisis period, 
the estimated probability (P^Crisis) ranges between 0 and 1 
which can further report increasing probability of crises 
during tranquility and declining probability during crises. 
x’, (x1,it, x2,it, ..., xK,it), is a vector of potential explanatory 
variables for banking crises including exchange rate 
depreciation and three indices for political stability, 
economic performance and debt status. Additionally, 
in Model 3, other variables; namely real GDP growth, 
inflation rate, interest rate, broad money to total reserve 
ratio, and domestic credit to GDP ratio that may represent 
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economic performance (other than Economic status) 
are tested to examine whether the specified model can 
completely capture all environmental conditions. In 
Model 4, we further test current account balance growth 
(∆CA) which may represent debt status of a country 
(other than Debt S) to investigate whether the model can 
completely capture debt status condition. The estimation 
of Equation 1 requires linearizing the relationship (Λ) 
and coefficients (β) as in Equation 2: 
Ln( PCrisis–––––––1 – PCrisis ) = x’β + ε  (2)
The maximum likelihood (ML) approach is adopted 
to estimate the coefficients of Equation 2 and to predict 
the probability of systemic banking crises. The fact that 
estimated probabilities deviate from their values of 0 and 
1 is a reason for including a stochastic error term (ε). 
In order to estimate the coefficients of Equation 2, the 
sample period of 1995-2010 is divided into two periods 
of in-sample (1995-2006) and out-of-sample (2007-
2010). The in-sample period estimates EWS, whereas 
the out-of sample period uses the estimated model to 
examine the predictive power of the estimated EWS in 
predicting new crises and non-crises periods. Although 
the sign of coefficients implies the direction of the 
influence of a factor (xk) on crises, it can indirectly show 
the effect of one unit change in xk on Pcrisis. Particularly, 
an estimated coefficient of such a model indicates the 
impact of one unit change in an explanatory variable 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 1998; Gujarati & Porter 
2009; Greene 2008). 
THE DATA AND THE EMPIRICAL 
SPECIFICATIONS
The current study uses a sample of 10 East Asian countries 
(Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Vietnam) to estimate an EWS for systemic banking crises. 
The sample ranges the period of 1995-2010 with a total 
of 160 annual observations including crises periods and 
explanatory variables. The systemic banking crises are 
obtained from Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) 
and Laeven and Valencia (2010) which represent seven 
episodes with the total length of 21 years.2 Additionally, 
explanatory variables are provided by two databases of 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
and EUROMONEY. 
Collected data is used to estimate the EWS as in 
Equation 3:
Ln[ P^Crisis–––––––1 – P^Crisis ] = C^ + β^1∆lnEXHt + β^2PoliticalSt–1 +
  β^3∆EconomicPt–1 + β
^
4DebtSt–1 (3)
where, P^Crisis denotes the estimated probability of crisis. 
C is constant, and (–1) refers to the lagged value of 4 
TABLE 1. Definition of variables
Independent variables Definition Mnemonic
Focal variables:
Exchange rate depreciation Change in log of Exchange rate ∆Ln EXH
Political Stability Political stability index comprising regulatory and political variables 
ranging from 0 to 25, with 25 representing the best political conditions.
PoliticalS
Economic Status Economic performance index comprising macroeconomic conditions 
and financial structure ranging from 0 to 25, with 25 representing the 
best economic conditions
∆EconomicP
Country Risk Country risk is measured by debt status index that ranges from 0 to 
10, with 10 exhibiting the best status.
DebtS
Variables for Robustness Test: 
Economic growth GDP growth rate ∆GDP
Inflation Annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed 
at specified intervals, such as yearly
Inflation rate
Money supply Measure of money multiplier by which reserve money creates money 
supply in the economy. M3 aggregate (or broad money) includes 
currency with the public and deposits.
Broad money/total 
reserves
Domestic credit to GDP Changes in financial resources provided by the Central Bank for 
lending in a country that establish a claim for repayment, in terms 
of GDP.
∆Domestic credit/
GDP
Interest rate The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation. ∆Realint
Current account balance growth Current account balance growth ∆CA
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explanatory variables (e.g. Equation 3 regresses the 
value of dependent variable in 2010 on the values of 
explanatory variables in 2009) where  β^i, i = 1, …, 
4 are the unknown coefficients of those explanatory 
variables including exchange rate depreciation 
(∆LnEXH), political stability index (Political S), 
economic performance index (Economic P), and debt 
status index (Debt S). 
Table 2 presents economic performance and 
political stability of sample countries using the average 
values of two indices ranging between 0 and 25, with 
25 representing the highest stability and performance. 
Economic performance index which considers bank 
and monetary stability, budget deficit or surplus, 
unemployment and economic growth captures economic 
and financial instability. Additionally, political stability 
index considers regulatory conditions, non-corruption 
perception, government stability, financial payments (e.g. 
as loans and dividends), and non-capital repatriation3. 
Finally, Debt status index considers debt stocks to GNP 
ratio, current account balance to GNP ratio, and debt 
service to exports ratio. This index spans from 0 to 10, 
with 10 representing the best status and shows instability 
in external sectors as well as debt payments hence, 
potential for speculative attacks.
The figures in Table 2 indicate that Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and South Korea respectively have provided the 
best economic environments which are 18.68, 17.20, 
and 14.09, as well as the best political environments that 
respectively are 23.03, 19.90, and 18.53;hence, politically 
more stable. Hong Kong and South Korea have the 
lowest debt with an index value of 10 for Hong Kong 
and 9.75 for South Korea. While Cambodia has the worst 
economic and political environment that respectively is 
4.45 and 6.05. Indonesia  has the highest debt with an 
index of 8.05. To sum, a politically stable country with 
high economic performance as well as low debt has low 
probability of crises.
Regarding to the EWS specification as in Equation 
3,the present study expects negative coefficients for 
previously discussed indices. As for the exchange rate 
depreciation, we expect a positive relationship with 
banking crises (Barrell et al. 2010; Biglaiser et al. 2011; 
Caprio & Klingebiel 2003; Cashin & Duttagupta 2008; 
Davis & Karim 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 
1998; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache 2005; Eichengreen 
et al. 1994; Eichengreen et al. 1996; Frankel & Rose 
1996; Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999; Männasoo & 
Mayes 2009).
RESULTS
Reports of the estimates and predictive power of 
logit models for four EWS are presented in Table 3. 
Model 1 shows the estimated coefficient of exchange 
rate depreciation, political stability index, economic 
performance index, and debt status index, which is used 
to predict the probability of systemic banking crises. 
Additionally, Models 2, 3, and 4 evaluate Model 1 for 
robustness to ensure that estimates and predictive power 
are robust to variables selection. We even remove political 
stability index to examine the contribution of political 
conditions to the predictive power of EWS.
Model 2 shows that other variables; namely 
exchange rate depreciation, economic performance index, 
and debt status index are still significant with expected 
signs. On the contrary, the in-sample predictive power 
of non-crises periods declines to 96.05 per cent. This 
implies that Model 1 outperforms Model 2 regarding the 
TABLE 2. Political stability, economic performance and debt status by country, 1995-2010
Political stabilitya Economic performanceb Debt statusc
Cambodia 6.05 4.45 8.60
China 16.72 11.96 9.11
Hong Kong 19.90 17.20 10.00
Indonesia 10.91 8.87 8.05
South Korea 18.53 14.09 9.75
Malaysia 17.36 12.29 8.25
The Philippines 13.06 9.36 8.35
Singapore 23.03 18.68 10.00
Thailand 15.75 10.89 8.55
Vietnam 11.30 8.13 8.52
a Political stability and economic performance are two indices for the political and economic conditions 
of the sample. The political stability is comprised of regulatory and political variables ranging from 0 
to 25, with 25 representing the best political conditions. 
b The economic performance is comprised of variables for macroeconomic conditions and financial 
structure ranging from 0 to 25, with 25 representing the best economic conditions. 
c Debt status is an index and ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 exhibiting the best status.
Source: EUROMONEY (1995-2010)
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predictive power because it includes political conditions. 
This results is consistent with Leblang and Satyanath 
(2008) that shows political variable improves the  crises 
forecasts as well as able to accurately predict the crises. 
Model 3 includes GDP growth, inflation rate, broad money 
to total reserves ratio, domestic credit to GDP ratio, and 
real interest rate. But they are insignificant implying 
economic performance index completely captures 
economic information. The in-sample predictive power 
of EWS for crises periods erodes from 80 per cent in 
Model 1 to 75 per cent in Model 3, which implies that 
Model 1 outperforms Model 3 regarding the predictive 
power. Although Model 3 predicts 100 per cent of non-
crises periods, it uses more economic variables which 
are insignificant. This indicates that the EWS with more 
variables may represent better predictive power, but 
this model is not preferable because it may have low 
predictive power for future crises. 
Finally, Model 4 demonstrates insignificant 
coefficient for current account balance growth in the 
presence of debt status index, which implies that Model 
1 with only debt status index can still capture debt-
related information. The in-sample predictive power of 
Model 4 for non-crises periods erodes from 97.37 per 
cent in Model 1 to 95.83 per cent, which implies that 
Model 1 outperforms Model 4 regarding the predictive 
power. Given previously discussed findings, Model 1 
outperforms other models in predicting crises and non-
crises periods by considering environmental factors 
better. Therefore, the following discussion is focused on 
Model 1 using the in-sample period of 1995-2006, which 
predicts 80 per cent of crises periods and 97.37 per cent 
of non-crises periods. 
Results in Model 1 of Table 3 show that 1 unit change 
in political stabilities, economic performance and debt 
status, the log odds of non-crisis period decreases by 
0.217, 0.662 and 0.493 respectively. The negative sign 
of the coefficients for political stabilities, economic 
performance and debt status indicate that the better 
condition of the countries’ political stabilities, economic 
performance and debt status, the less likely the countries 
to be in the crisis period. In other words, the results imply 
that countries with better political stabilities, economic 
performance and debt status are more likely to be in 
non-crisis period. Not only those conditions, the positive 
significant sign of exchange rate depreciation (32.4) 
indicates that domestic currency deterioration during 
crises affects foreign reserves depletion which causes 
capital flights and exacerbates crises (Davis et al. 2011; 
Eichengreen et al. 1994; Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999; 
Männasoo & Mayes 2009) .
Regarding the environmental conditions, the 
significant negative coefficient of political stability index 
(-0.217)indicates that corruption, government instability, 
financial payment and regulatory problems are associated 
with higher probability of crises, which is consistent with 
the discussions of (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache 2005; 
Eichengreen et al. 1996; Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999; Noy 
2004) .  Additionally, the negative coefficient of economic 
performance (-0.662) indicates that problems in financial 
and real sectors, banking industries, monetary and 
currency policies expose banks to crises, which is similar 
TABLE 3. The early warning systems for systemic banking crises during the in-sample period of 1995-2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
∆LnEXH 32.400*** 29.455*** 44.674*** 28.315***
PoliticalS -0.217*
∆EconomicP -0.662*** -0.623*** -0.490* -0.627***
DebtS -0.493*** -0.564*** -0.487* -0.510**
∆GDP -0.197
Inflation rate 0.245
Broad money/total reserves 0.220
∆Domestic credit/GDP 0.008
∆Real int 0.085
∆CA -0.214
Constant 3.953* 1.421 -1.608 1.006
In-sample: % crisis Prediction 80 80 75 80
In-sample: % no crisis Prediction 97.37 96.05 100 95.83
Note: The political stability, economic performance, and debt status are indices for political, economic (excluding debt), 
and debt variables, respectively. 
 Threshold level for prediction = 50%
 *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
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to the findings of (Barrell et al. 2011; Demirguc-Kunt & 
Detragiache 2005; Eichengreen et al. 1996; Kaminsky 
& Reinhart 1999). Finally, the negative relationship 
between high debt and crises (-0.493)indicates that the 
lower the debt status index, the higher is the debt of a 
country which increases the probability of crises. The 
lower the debt status index draws attention to the role of 
investors in increasing probability of crises. The increased 
in short-term debt is a signal of upcoming crises, which 
may cause deposit withdrawal and speculative attacks 
by investors (Ivashina & Scharfstein 2010; Radelet 
et al. 1998). 
For robustness check, we insert the coefficients of 
Model 1 into Equation 3 that results in Equation 4.The 
specified EWS of Equation 4 using the in-sample data of 
1995-2006 able to predict 83 per cent of crises and non-
crises periods of out-of-sample data.  We can conclude 
that better economic and political environments as well 
as lower debt reduce the probability of banking crises. 
In addition, exchange rate depreciation during crises has 
significant influence on triggering speculative attacks, 
hence worsen the crises.
CONCLUSION
This study develops an EWS for systemic banking 
crises using economic and political conditions as well 
as speculative attacks to consider human behaviors. 
This study estimates the probability of banking crises 
in 10 East Asian countries using logit models during 
the period of 1995-2010. Our results illustrate that 
economic and political conditions may lead to a systemic 
banking crisis. For economic conditions, current 
account deficits, economic slowdowns, financial sector 
problems, monetary and currency instability, as well as 
inefficient regulations increase speculative attack which 
finally increase the probability of a crisis. Furthermore, 
this paper found that debt status, and exchange rate 
depreciation are signals for investors to withdraw their 
money from banks and projects, which lead to speculative 
attacks and in turn increase the probability of crises. 
Additionally, political factors, such as government 
instability, corruption, regulatory environment, and 
financial payment obligations delay authorities’ reaction 
towards responding to crises. In short, lagged reactions 
by the authorities reduce the effectiveness of policies 
implemented. In summary, the present study reveals 
that speculative attacks (weak economic condition, 
debt status, exchange rate) and human behaviors (weak 
political condition) are critical factors in estimating 
probability of crisis.
From practitioner’s perspective, debt status and 
exchange rate depreciation are warnings to investors 
of upcoming crises, which cause speculative attacks. 
Additionally, poor economic condition increases the 
probability of systemic banking crises such as in the East 
Asian countries. Not only that, economic and political 
instabilities may delay the process of adopting crises 
prevention policies and exacerbate speculative attacks. 
The findings from this study may help policymakers 
and managers in detecting the increased probabilities of 
crises. The predicted probabilities help them to adopt pre-
emptive strategies to avoid or reduce the repercussions 
of systemic crises.
The findings suggest that managers and policymakers 
should monitor political and economic conditions as 
well as debt status constantly because they are important 
determinants for EWS. Balance of payment deficits, debt, 
and exchange rate depreciation may lead to a crisis if 
investors and speculators respond negatively to short-
term debt and sudden exchange rate depreciation. For 
future research, we would suggest for other factors 
related to human behavior being taken into account 
to improve the effectiveness of EWS in predicting 
future crises.
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ENDNOTES
1 In addition to those criteria, there are two more conditions 
that can solely indicate the onset of a crisis; namely non-
performing loans of more than 20 per cent of total banking 
system assets and public bailout of more than 5 per cent 
of GDP.
2 Seven episodes refer to China (1998), Indonesia (1997-
2001), Malaysia (1997-99), South Korea (1997-98), 
Thailand (1997-2000), the Philippines (1997-2001) and 
Vietnam (1997).
3 Capital repatriation is capital transfer from abroad to a 
home country, and some foreign governments impose 
restriction on capital transfer. Either huge capital outflow 
or capital transfer restriction can be a signal of upcoming 
crises.
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